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Did Bohr understand EPR?
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Abstract: In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) famously published a
paper arguing for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, using the example of
two spatially separated but entangled particles. In his almost equally famous
reply, Niels Bohr argued against EPR by providing a careful analysis of quantum
measurements from the point of view of complementarity. Perhaps oddly, this
analysis focuses on the example of a single particle passing through a slit. In this
paper I argue that the disanalogy between the two examples is only apparent, and
does not constitute an obstacle in trying to understand Bohr’s views on
complementarity.
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1. Introduction
We need to return to Bohr’s own words, filtered through no
preconceived philosophical dogmas. We need to apply the critical
tools of the historian in order to establish what those words were and
how they changed over time. We need to assume, at least
provisionally, that Bohr’s words make sense. And we need to apply
the synthetic tools of the philosopher in order to reconstruct from
Bohr’s words a coherent philosophy of physics.1
Bohr’s philosophy of physics has attracted a great deal of both admiration
and detraction from many sides. A case in point is his reply to the paper
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by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen of 1935 arguing for the incompleteness of
quantum mechanics,2 which is one of the most cited of Bohr’s writings on
the foundations of quantum mechanics, because it contains a particularly
careful analysis of quantum mechanical measurements from the point of
view of complementarity. The present paper intends to give a fresh look at
some crucial aspects of Bohr’s reply to EPR, in the spirit of Don Howard’s
remarks above — which are as actual now as when they were first made in
the wake of the centennial of Bohr’s birth.
The argument by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen was ultimately an
outgrowth of the discussions between Einstein and Bohr on the photon-box
thought experiment, which took place at the sixth Solvay conference in
October 1930.3 As described in Bohr’s account of the discussions, the
original photon-box thought experiment was an attempt by Einstein to
undermine the energy-time uncertainty relations, as follows. Take a box
containing both monochromatic radiation and a clock regulating the
automatic opening of a shutter. The clock can be used to measure the time
of emission of a photon, and weighing the box before and after the
emission can be used to measure the energy of the photon via relativistic
mass-energy equivalence — both seemingly with arbitrary accuracy.
According to Bohr, he and Einstein eventually worked out that the
weighing of the box interfered with the operation of the clock via
gravitational red-shift, thus confirming the validity of the uncertainty
relations.4
At the latest after this episode, Einstein appears to have switched from
trying to “beat” the uncertainty relations to accepting them and trying to
use them to derive paradoxical consequences of quantum mechanics. The
further specific transformations of the photon-box thought experiment are
well described in the literature.5 Suffice it to say that by mid-1931
Ehrenfest was describing to Bohr how Einstein understood the photon-box
as an apparatus that by way of mutually exclusive operations on the box
allowed one to predict either the time of arrival of the emitted photon at
some observation point or the energy of the emitted photon, and such that
the choice of the operation to be performed could be made well after the
2Bohr (1935); Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935).
3See for instance Jammer (1974), Sect. 6.2, Fine (1986), Ch. 3, Howard (1985, 1990)
and Held (1998), Ch. 3.
4See Bohr (1949).
5See the references cited in footnote 3.
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photon had been emitted. As Ehrefest put it (“however, I am not able to
formulate it in such a way as to be sure he would be happy with my
formulation”), the point of interest for Einstein was
to realise that the projectile [the emitted photon], which is already
flying around isolated “by itself”, must be ready to fulfil very
different ““noncommuting”” prophecies, “without even knowing”
which of these prophecies one will make (and verify).6
The final form of the thought experiment was given in the EPR paper: one
takes two particles in a simultaneous eigenstate of the two commuting
quantities P2 + P1 and Q2 −Q1 (sum of momenta and difference of
positions). Assuming that the corresponding eigenvalues are, e.g., 0 and
x0, quantum mechanics predicts that if a measurement of P1 yields the
outcome p, a subsequent measurement of P2 will yield with probability 1
the outcome −p, and that if a measurement of Q1 yields the outcome x, a
subsequent measurement of Q2 will yield with probability 1 the outcome
x+ x0. If the two systems are no longer interacting, we can assume we can
carry out a measurement of either momentum or position on particle 1
without interacting with particle 2.7
The EPR argument is a direct argument for the incompleteness of
quantum mechanics, in the sense that EPR give an argument for the
existence of certain “elements of reality” that are not present in the
quantum mechanical description. In order to do this, EPR need a
(sufficient) criterion for determining when such elements of reality are
present: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with
certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to
this physical quantity”.8 Applying the criterion of reality to the thought
experiment, EPR argue that at least one of the position and momentum of
particle 2 is an element of reality not present in the quantum mechanical
description. We need not worry about the detailed logic of the argument
— which has been the subject of debate — since what is of interest to us is
6Ehrenfest to Bohr, 9 July [1931], AHQP-EHR17 (in German) [the idiosyncratic use
of quotation marks is in the original].
7One can of course imagine that x0 is very large, but EPR themselves do not
explicitly use this.
8Einstein Podolsky and Rosen (1935), p. 777, whole passage emphasised in the
original.
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Bohr’s own understanding of the argument in his reply, which we shall
discuss in the next section.9
As mentioned, Bohr’s reply to EPR is an important source for Bohr’s
views on complementarity, a much-debated issue being whether it marks a
turning point in Bohr’s views. Mara Beller and Arthur Fine in particular
have made a powerful case for a shift in Bohr’s understanding of
complementarity in his reply to EPR, and the ensuing debate has focused
mainly on whether Bohr thereby came to espouse a positivist view.10 The
discussion below will not be directed towards this particular question, but
will address a related point.
Until 1935, the understanding of complementarity appears to have been
grounded in the idea of an uncontrollable physical exchange (of the order
of the quantum of action), and EPR’s focus on two spatially separated
particles appears to undermine this idea, since there can be no physical
exchange between the measuring apparatus and the distant particle.
Oddly, however, Bohr’s reply to EPR seems to minimise any conceptual
differences between the case of measurements on a single particle and the
EPR case. Indeed, Bohr spends a large part of his reply to EPR discussing
the example of one particle going through a single slit — essentially the
same as the example he had famously discussed with Einstein at the 1927
Solvay conference11 — and he prefaces his subsequent analysis of the EPR
example with the words: “The last remarks apply equally well to the
special problem treated by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, which has been
referred to above, and which does not actually involve any greater
intricacies than the simple examples discussed above”12 This is odd
9For a nice discussion of the logic of the EPR paper, see Fine (2013). It is also
well-known that Einstein was dissatisfied with the presentation in the published paper
(which was written by Podolsky) and preferred to present the case for incompleteness as
an indirect argument, as follows. Once we have ceased to interact with particle 2, our
measurements cannot affect its real state. The measurements on particle 1 can only yield
(perhaps incomplete) information on the real state of particle 2. By performing different
measurements on particle 1, we obtain different quantum mechanical state descriptions
for particle 2. But we cannot obtain different complete descriptions of the same real
state. Thus the quantum mechanical state descriptions obtained through the different
measurements on particle 1 must be incomplete. See Howard (1985) and Fine (1986),
Ch. 3, for details.
10See Beller and Fine (1994), Beller (1999), Ch. 7, and for the ensuing debate, e.g.,
Whitaker (2004), Fine (2007), and references therein.
11See again Bohr (1949).
12Bohr (1935), p. 699.
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precisely because in the case of the single particle Bohr’s arguments appear
to be grounded in very physical intuitions, e.g., the idea that in a
measurement of the position of the particle an uncontrollable amount of
momentum passes from the diaphragm used for the measurement into the
rigid support defining the laboratory frame.13 In the EPR case, instead,
with its threat of “spooky action at a distance”, the physical grounding of
Bohr’s arguments seems rather less immediate.
In the following Section 2, which is the core of the paper, I shall try to
spell out more clearly the analogy between the single-particle case and the
EPR case, arguing that Bohr is correct in taking EPR to involve no
“greater intricacies”. More precisely, I shall argue that Bohr understands
both the single-particle case and the EPR case as composed of a first stage
in which the “uncontrollable” physical exchange takes place, and a second
stage involving no further interaction with the system of interest. Thus,
while Bohr is (rightly or wrongly) treating “spookiness” as unproblematic,
he sees it as a feature that is already present in his treatment of the
single-particle case.
Section 3 provides some additional support for this proposed reading of
Bohr’s reply in the form of a remarkable letter by Pauli to Schro¨dinger
from July 1935.
Finally, returning to the “big picture”, I shall conclude in Section 4 by
briefly suggesting that it was not specifically the separation of the particles
in the EPR paper that prompted a shift in Bohr’s view of complementarity
in the mid-1930s — at least assuming that the proposed reading
corresponds to Bohr’s understanding of measurements already prior to
1935.
2. Bohr’s argument and the analogy with EPR
In the introduction to his 1935 reply, Bohr gives a sketch of the EPR
argument, hinting at where he will apply his criticism. After making a few
preliminary remarks and introducing EPR’s criterion of reality, Bohr states
13I believe the phrasing of this “lab frame argument” in Bohr’s reply to EPR is
somewhat misleading; for discussion, see Bacciagaluppi and Crull (2015a). For an
alternative, more literal reading see Dickson (2004).
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that
[b]y means of an interesting example, to which we shall return below,
[EPR] proceed to show that in quantum mechanics, just as in
classical mechanics, it is possible under suitable conditions to predict
the value of any given variable pertaining to the description of a
mechanical system from measurements performed entirely on other
systems which previously have been in interaction with the system
under investigation.14
Application of the criterion of reality to predictions of canonically
conjugate quantities then leads EPR to conclude that quantum mechanics
is incomplete. Bohr’s criticism, he tells us, will be that the EPR criterion
of reality “contains ... an essential ambiguity when it is applied to the
actual problems with which we are here concerned”.15
One can easily think of a classical example in which it is indeed possible to
predict values of canonically conjugate quantities of one system from
suitable measurements on a second system. Assume we have two classical
systems, say with equal masses and known (centre-of-mass) positions and
momenta, and assume the initial common centre-of-mass position and the
total momentum are both zero. Assume the two systems collide, say
elastically, but we do not know their shapes and sizes, so that we cannot
calculate their respective positions and momenta after the collision.
Nevertheless, since the total momentum is conserved and the common
centre of mass remains at rest, we know that after the collision x2 = −x1
and p2 = −p1. Measuring position or momentum on one of the two
systems now allows us to “predict with certainty” the value of the same
quantity on the other system. Classically, of course, we are not merely
predicting the results of further measurements. We know that both
systems have definite values of position and of momentum, and that these
values for the two systems have become correlated through the interaction.
What we are doing is simply inferring what they are. But we could also
infer the independent existence of the predicted values by applying EPR’s
criterion of reality. In the classical case, Bohr would arguably not object to
this move. In the quantum mechanical case, by contrast, he objects
precisely to the application of the criterion of reality.
14Bohr (1935), p. 696.
15Bohr (1935), p. 697.
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In order to understand Bohr’s reply, I thus suggest, we need to look for
how the analogy between the classical and quantum cases breaks down in a
way that makes the EPR criterion “ambiguous” and blocks its application
to the EPR example. My contention is that Bohr’s treatment of the
single-particle case serves precisely this end, and not merely that of
illustrating how the “general viewpoint”16 of complementarity works in a
familiar case.
In order to see this, the crucial insight one needs is that Bohr thinks of
such experimental procedures, both classically and quantum mechanically
and in both the single-particle and the EPR case, as involving two stages.
The system of interest is not manipulated directly, instead it interacts in a
first stage with some auxiliary system. It is the auxiliary system that is
then manipulated, and in this second stage one no longer “mechanically
disturbs” the system of interest. Such an auxiliary system might be the
nearby particle in the EPR case or the diaphragm in the single-particle
case: it turns out that the analysis is exactly the same.
By way of example, we shall now discuss Bohr’s own example of a particle
passing through a movable diaphragm. We shall first look at it classically,
and then try to identify where the analogy breaks down in the passage to
quantum mechanics.17
Assume we know the initial momentum of the particle and of the
diaphragm. The particle is our system of interest S, and the diaphragm is
our auxiliary system M . When the particle passes through the slit, it
collides with the edges of the slit and exchanges momentum with the
diaphragm. By measuring the position of the diaphragm, we can predict
also the result of a further measurement of the particle’s position (at least
immediately after its passage through the diaphragm). And if we measure
the momentum of the diaphragm, we can predict also the result of a
further measurement of the particle’s momentum.
Note that the interaction between S and M has not left S undisturbed.
Indeed, a collision will have disturbed the momentum of S. But we need
not worry about this, because the purpose of the measurement is not to
16Bohr (1935), p. 696.
17Without going into details, today’s quantum measurement theory agrees with such a
two-stage analysis of measurements, generalising it to the case of so-called
positive-operator-valued measures (POVMs). See, e.g., the textbooks by Busch, Lahti
and Mittelstaedt (1996) and Busch, Grabowski and Lahti (1997).
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extract information about the initial state of S (note that the initial
momentum of the particle is in fact known), but to make predictions about
the final values of position or momentum of S. (We might prefer to call
such procedures “state preparations” rather than “measurements”, but the
terminology is inessential.) What is important is that once we have
measured the momentum (or the position) of the diaphragm, we are able
to reconstruct what has happened during the interaction between S and M
with regard to the exchanged momentum (or the relative spatial
co-ordination) of the two systems. As Bohr puts it: “the question of
principal interest for our discussion is now to what extent the momentum
thus exchanged can be taken into account in the description of the
phenomenon to be studied by the experimental arrangement concerned”.18
Since the particle and the diaphragm have ceased to interact and we
subsequently interact only with the diaphragm, there is no further
“mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation during the last
critical stage of the measuring procedure”.19 Thus, if we can reconstruct
the relevant aspects of the original interaction, we can indeed reliably
predict the result of a further measurement of momentum or position on
the particle.
Classically, there is no problem with this analysis, and since the particle
always has a position and a momentum, we are simply inferring what their
values are. Quantum mechanically, we cannot presuppose that the particle
has definite values of position and momentum simultaneously, but EPR
argue that by applying the criterion of reality we can nevertheless infer it
has. Bohr’s move in order to block this final inference, as I see it, is
precisely to emphasise that, in order to make the prediction, we not only
need no mechanical disturbance of the system of interest when we perform
the measurement on the auxiliary system, but it is crucial that we be able
to reconstruct what has happened during the previous interaction between
the two systems: in Bohr’s words we need to be able to “control ... the
reaction of the object on the measuring instruments if these are to serve
their purpose”.20 And this is precisely where the analogy between classical
and quantum mechanics breaks down.
Indeed, according to Bohr, in order to use the diaphragm to predict the
momentum of the particle, one has to measure the momentum of the
18Bohr (1935), p. 697.
19Bohr (1935), p. 700.
20Bohr (1935), p. 697.
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diaphragm itself, but then one renounces the applicability of the space-time
picture, and cuts oneself off from the possibility of reconstructing the
relative spatial co-ordination of particle and diaphragm. And in order to
use the diaphragm to predict the position of the particle, one has to
measure the position of the diaphragm, but then one renounces the
applicability of the law of conservation of momentum, and cuts oneself off
from the possibility of reconstructing the exchange of momentum between
the particle and the diaphragm.21 Thus, we are able to reconstruct the
salient aspects of the interaction only if we choose to use the auxiliary
system as a measuring apparatus for the corresponding quantity.
Thus, the sense in which EPR’s criterion of reality is ambiguous for Bohr
is that while “[o]f course there is in a case like that just considered no
question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation”,22
it is our choice of using the auxiliary system as a measuring device for one
particular quantity that enables us in the first place to reconstruct the
aspects of the original interaction that are needed for predicting the value
of that quantity. In Bohr’s words, “there is essentially the question of an
influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of
predictions regarding the future behavior of the system”.23 If “without
disturbing the system” should mean “without disturbing the conditions
enabling predictions on the system”, then the conclusion of the EPR
criterion would follow, but the premise does not apply. If it should mean
“without mechanically disturbing the system”, then the premise would
apply, but at least according to Bohr the conclusion does not follow. For
Bohr, the fact that in the quantum case a disturbance of the conditions
enabling predictions on the system does take place suggests the need for “a
radical revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical reality”.24
One might wish to scrutinise further the last step in Bohr’s reasoning, but
this is now quite a separate point from the one I wish to make. What I
think should be clear from the above way of presenting Bohr’s argument, is
that the clash between EPR’s reasoning based on the criterion of reality
and Bohr’s strategy for blocking it is played out in full already in the case
21I find Howard’s (1994) analysis of Bohr’s doctrine of classical concepts particularly
helpful in understanding this aspect of Bohr’s reasoning. The details of how Bohr
understands “cutting oneself off”, however, are inessential for the purposes of this paper.
See also Bacciagaluppi and Crull (2015a).
22Bohr (1935), p. 700.
23Bohr (1935), p. 700, emphasis in the original.
24Bohr (1935), p. 697.
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of the particle and the diaphragm. Indeed, the lack of direct interaction
with the system of interest, after the original interaction between the
system and the auxiliary system has ceased, is an integral part of how
Bohr conceives of a quantum state preparation. True, in the EPR example
not only is there no direct interaction with the distant particle, there
cannot be any because the two particles are now spatially separated. But
from the point of view I am here attributing to Bohr, the fact that the lack
of interaction is guaranteed by the spatial separation is a neat but
inessential feature of the EPR example.
Bohr does go on to discuss explicitly the EPR state, and suggests a
thought experiment for preparing it:
The particular quantum-mechanical state of two free particles, for
which [EPR] give an explicit mathematical expression, may be
reproduced, at least in principle, by a simple experimental
arrangement, comprising a rigid diaphragm with two parallel slits,
which are very narrow compared with their separation, and through
each of which one particle with given initial momentum passes
independently of the other. If the momentum of this diaphragm is
measured accurately before as well as after the passing of the
particles, we shall in fact know the sum of the components
perpendicular to the slits of the momenta of the two escaping
particles, as well as the difference of their initial positional
coordinates in the same direction; while of course the conjugate
quantities, i.e., the difference of the components of their momenta,
and the sum of their positional coordinates, are entirely unknown.25
But this example is entirely analogous to the single-particle one, with the
role of the auxiliary system played now by the second particle instead of
the (single-slit) diaphragm. The only difference between the two cases is
that in the single-particle case there is a direct interaction between system
of interest and auxiliary system, while in the two-particle case the
interaction is mediated by the (two-slit) diaphragm: the particles exchange
momentum and get correlated in position via their separate interactions
with the diaphragm. The diaphragm itself plays no further role in the
analysis.
25Bohr (1935), p. 699. Note that the state in Bohr’s thought experiment is only
approximately equal to the EPR state (which is anyway improper, i.e., not
mathematically representable by an element of the Hilbert space), due to the finite
width of the two slits in the diaphragm.
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Should the point need reinforcing, think again of the classical case: there is
no need for the two systems S and M to have interacted directly. Indeed,
we could let two balls pass through two slits in a macroscopic screen, so
that they both collide with the screen but do not interact directly with
each other. Knowing the initial momentum of the balls and the screen, and
measuring the momentum of the screen after the passage of the balls, we
then know the total momentum of the two balls, as well as the difference in
their positions. By measuring the momentum of one of the balls, we can
then reconstruct the (mediated) exchange of momentum between the two
balls. And by measuring the position of one of the two balls, we can
determine (by determining the position of the screen) the position of the
other ball at the time the balls passed through the screen. Since we are not
interfering with the other ball, either directly or indirectly, these are
reliable procedures for predicting results of measurements of the
momentum or (immediately after passage) the position of the other ball.
Again, the only difference between this and the case of a single system lies
in the details of the initial interaction between the system of interest and
the auxiliary system (whether it is direct or indirect). In both cases, we
have the same absence of interaction with the system of interest when we
perform the measurement on the auxiliary system.
3. Pauli on Bohr’s reply
As additional support for the above reading of Bohr’s discussion of the
single particle, I wish to quote from a letter from Pauli to Schro¨dinger of 9
July 1935,26 in which Pauli comments on Bohr’s not yet published reply to
EPR:
One lets a particle with a given momentum in the z-direction pass
through an opening L found in a screen, which as a whole is free to
move in the x-direction.27 [Figure omitted.] Furthermore, the
26Schro¨dinger’s correspondence from the summer of 1935, not only with Pauli (and
famously with Einstein) but also with various other physicists, is a rich source of insights
into the EPR debate. It will be included in translation in Bacciagaluppi and Crull
(2015a).
27Given that knowledge of the particle’s momentum in the x-direction is what is
crucial in the argument, I assume Pauli here means the particle’s momentum lies wholly
in the z-direction. That is, a plane wave is approaching the screen perpendicularly, and
has zero momentum parallel to it.
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momentum px of the screen in the x-direction is known before the
particle has passed through L. After the particle has passed through
L, I now still have the free choice — both times without disturbing
the particle mechanically — either to measure once again px on the
screen: then I can with certainty predict the magnitude and direction
of the particle’s momentum after its passage through L — or after
the passage of the particle through L, I can measure the position x of
the screen S; then I can also predict the position of the particle, at
least an “arbitrarily short” time after the position measurement on S,
as this will then coincide with that of S.28
After describing also the two-slit case, Pauli (addressing a point
Schro¨dinger had raised about the notion of “state”) emphasises again both
the experimenter’s freedom of choice and the lack of disturbance of the
system, and makes it clear that he at least thinks they are general features
of quantum state preparations:
Thus far Bohr.
Now, whether one should describe “pure case” as a state? ... A pure
case of A is an overall situation in which the results of particular
measurements on A (a maximal set) are predictable with certainty. I
have nothing against calling this the “state” — but even then it is
the case that changing the state of A — i.e., that which is predictable
of A — lies within the free choice of the experimenter even without
directly disturbing A itself — i.e., even after isolating A. ... In my
opinion there is in fact no problem here — and one knows the fact in
question even without the Einstein example.29
Note that Schro¨dinger did not have to wait to be told by Pauli.30 Already
on 14 June, more than three weeks earlier, Schro¨dinger wrote to Edward
Teller about state preparations in very similar if somewhat more colourful
terms:
According to quantum mechanics, the preparation of a system,
whereby it is brought into a certain given state, does not merely
consist in material treatment of the system with tools of all kinds,
but, rather, what happens afterwards depends on what one does with
28Pauli (1985), p. 419.
29Pauli (1985), p. 420.
30See also footnote 34 in the next section.
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the tools — whether one burns them, melts them down, tramples on
them or preserves them in a museum — but in particular whether one
pays attention to the signs of wear on the tools, and which ones.31
Unlike Pauli, Schro¨dinger does think “there is in fact a problem here”, as
he clearly expresses earlier in the same letter: “This assumption arises
from the standpoint of the savage, who believes that he can harm his
enemy by piercing the enemy’s image with a needle”.
4. Conclusion
As Rosenfeld informs us, when the EPR paper was published in 1935,
“[t]his onslaught came down upon us as a bolt from the blue”, and “as
soon as Bohr had heard my report of Einstein’s argument, everything else
was abandoned”.32 What was it that seemingly took Bohr by surprise in
the EPR paper? Prima facie, there are two obvious (not mutually
exclusive) candidates. The first one is the criterion of reality, which
allowed EPR to formulate a direct argument for the incompleteness of
quantum mechanics. And, indeed, the explicit thrust of Bohr’s reply is
directed at undermining EPR’s criterion of reality. The second one is the
separation of the two particles in the EPR example, which, as mentioned
in Section1, could be thought of as undermining the previous grounding of
complementarity in the idea of an uncontrollable physical exhange. But
this should not have taken Bohr by surprise, since we have already
mentioned in Section 1 that Bohr had received a fairly detailed report of
Einstein’s ideas from Ehrenfest in July 1931, and there were other
intimations of what was to come.33
In this connection, it would be interesting to see if our analysis of Section 2
(assuming it is correct) corresponded to Bohr’s understanding of the
particle-and-slit experiment already before 1935. If so, Bohr would have
already understood perfectly well that manipulations on one system affect
31Von Meyenn (2011), Vol. 2, p. 533.
32Rosenfeld (1967).
33For the lead-up to the EPR paper, from the photon-box thought experiment of 1930
onwards, see in particular Jammer (1974), Sect. 6.2, Howard (1990) and Held (1998),
Ch. 3. Note that Held (1998), p. 99, suggests explicitly that the elements of the EPR
argument were all known to Bohr previously to 1935, with the notable exception of the
criterion of reality.
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predictions on another system that no longer interacts with the first, and
the conceptual import of the separation of the two particles in the EPR
example would have been no novelty for him. Something of the kind seems
in fact to be implied by Pauli’s comments in his letter to Schro¨dinger
quoted above in Section 3.
In order to do this, we would have to trace the origins of the essential
aspects underpinning the analogy with the EPR example, namely: (a) the
two-stage structure of a quantum measurement, in which first the system
of interest interacts with an auxiliary system and then a measurement is
performed on the latter; (b) the freedom to choose which measurement to
perform on the auxiliary system; and — crucially — (c) the fact that the
manipulation of the auxiliary system involves no longer any interaction
with the system of interest.
This is not entirely straighforward, because explicit emphasis on these
aspects is much easier to find in Einstein and physicists connected to him
than in Bohr and his circle.34 Some precedents and parallels can be found,
however.
While aspect (a) is at least implicitly present in most discussions, it is
quite explicit in systematic treatments of measurements such as the
treatment of measurements in von Neumann’s book35 and, perhaps more
relevantly to Bohr, in Pauli’s famous handbook article.36 Pauli’s treatment
of measurements of the “second kind” (in which the system is not left in
an eigenstate of the measured observable37) is especially interesting, both
because Pauli uses a very general description of measurement
(corresponding to POVMs, in modern terminology), and because his
discussion involves reconstructing from the reading of the measuring
apparatus what has happened during its interaction with the system, and
is thus closest to Bohr’s 1935 discussion (though without explicitly
mentioning lack of disturbance).
34Recall for instance the letter by Ehrenfest to Bohr quoted in Section 1. Another
very explicit source, containing yet another early variant of the EPR thought
experiment, is a letter by Schro¨dinger to Sommerfeld of 11 December 1931, in von
Meyenn (2011), Vol. 1, pp. 489-490. The above letter by Pauli to Schro¨dinger is a
remarkably explicit source from the Bohr circle, but not a very early one (July 1935).
35Von Neumann (1932), Ch. VI.
36Pauli (1933), Sect. 9.
37Pauli (1933), pp. 98-99 of the 1990 edition.
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Also aspect (b) is clearly present in Bohr’s own emphasis, in his 1927
discussions with Einstein about the two-slit experiment, on the
experimenter’s freedom of choice in measuring either the path of a particle
or the interference at the screen — by either measuring the momentum of
the two-slit diaphragm or bolting it to the lab frame.38 It is perhaps
present also in Bohr’s comments on the Heisenberg microscope in the
Como lecture.
Aspect (c) is clearly the most elusive of the three. Weizsa¨cker comes close
to it in his own analysis of the Heisenberg microscope, in which the
scattered photon is observed either in the image plane of the microscope
(yielding a measurement of the position of the electron) or in the focal
plane of the microscope (yielding a measurement of the momentum of the
elctron).39 However, when in 1967 Weizsa¨cker’s attention was attracted to
the “delayed-choice” aspect of his analysis by Max Jammer, Weizsa¨cker
did not recall having noticed the analogy with EPR in 1935.40
There is one author, however, who did use explicitly and in print the
delayed-choice aspect of the Heisenberg microscope before Bohr’s reply to
EPR (in fact two months before the publication of the EPR paper). This
was Grete Hermann in the essay containing her argument for the causal
completeness of quantum mechanics.41 Hermann argues that quantum
mechanics drives a wedge between causality and predictability: that while
causal notions can no longer be used in predicting results of observations,
in each observational context one can give a retrospective causal analysis of
38Note that Bohr’s account is retrospective; see Bohr (1949). Note also that in the
1927 discussion there is no suggestion yet that the choice could be made after the
particle has passed through the slits.
39Weizsa¨cker (1931).
40See Jammer (1974), pp. 178-180, and Weizsa¨cker (1985), Ch. 11 (Sect. 9.3.4 β of the
2006 edition). Jammer (1974), p. 97, also points out that the Heisenberg microscope and
Bohr’s particle-and-slit experiment are variants of each other. Indeed, also in the
microscope example one has two systems whose momenta are known before they
interact: the electron’s position is smeared out over the object plane, so its momentum
in that plane is sharply defined (at least approximately, because of the finite dimensions
of the microscope), and the wavelength of the photon is known. Thus, like in Bohr’s
example, immediately after the collision the sum of the momenta (in the object plane) is
known and the difference of positions is zero.
41Hermann’s essay provides a comprehensive philosophical analysis of quantum
mechanics from a very specific neo-Kantian point of view; see Hermann (1935). For a
well-known recounting of Hermann’s extensive discussions with Heisenberg and
Weizsa¨cker, see Heisenberg (1969), Ch. 10.
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the measurement.42 Her main example is precisely the γ-ray microscope,
for which she argues that, both in the case in which the photon is observed
in the image plane of the microscope and in the case it is observed in the
focal plane, one can trace the cause for where the photon is actually
observed.43 In fact, apart from the explicit emphasis on causation,
Hermann’s analysis closely matches Bohr’s, in which, depending on the
free choice of the observer, one is able to reconstruct only one or another
aspect of the original interaction between system of interest and auxiliary
system, leading to different kinds of predictions on the system.
If Bohr thought of quantum measurements already before 1935 in terms
closely analogous to what would become the EPR example, this may have
implications for the understanding of Bohr’s views on complementarity,
specifically for the way they may have changed as a result of the EPR
paper in 1935. The analysis of Section 2 should, however, have established
that Bohr’s understanding of quantum measurements was strictly
analogous to the EPR example at least in 1935. The apparent disanalogy
is thus not a problem in understanding Bohr’s reply to EPR and the
discussion of complementarity contained in it.
Appendix
I collect in this appendix some further material on the precedents and
parallels of Bohr’s understanding of quantum measurements as discussed
above.
Ad (a). Both von Neumann and Pauli are interested in giving an account
of how the apparatus can be included in the quantum mechanical
description of a measurement, which is “crucial for a consistent analysis of
the concept of measurement” — as Pauli puts it.44 Von Neumann’s main
result is to prove the existence of a Hamiltonian that will take an initial
state
∑
n cnϕnξ of system and apparatus into a state
∑
n cnϕnξn, so that
applying the projection postulate to the system or to the apparatus will
produce the same results.45 Pauli is actually more explicit and more
42Hermann (1935), Sect. 12.
43Hermann (1935), Sect. 10.
44Pauli (1933), p. 92 in the. Page references are to the 1990 edition.
45Pauli (1933), Sect. VI.3. Immediately before that, von Neumann proves his
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general than von Neumann in his treatment. He first models in detail a
Stern-Gerlach experiment,46 showing both that measuring the centre of
mass of the atom after it has passed through the magnetic field yields the
expected probability distribution for the internal states of energy of the
atom, and that the atom subsequently behaves (with regard to any further
measurements) as a statistical mixture of eigenstates of its internal energy.
As mentioned, Pauli’s treatment of measurements of the “second kind” is
especially interesting, both because Pauli uses a more general description
of measurement, and because his discussion is close to Bohr’s 1935
discussion. In Pauli’s general treatment, given an initial state un of the
system, the final state of system and apparatus will be∑
k
v
(n)
k Uk , (1)
where the Uk form an orthonormal basis (and some of the unnormalised
v
(n)
k could be the zero vector). For a general initial state
∑
n cnun, the final
state will thus be ∑
k
ψkUk :=
∑
n,k
cnv
(n)
k Uk , (2)
and after the reading of the apparatus the state of the system becomes
ψk =
∑
n cnv
(n)
k (up to normalisation).
47 Pauli then considers the special
case in which for different n one gets disjoint sets of Uk in Eq. 1, i.e., the
case in which for each k the summation in Eq.2 is over only one value of n.
In this case, by observing the result k, the final state ψk of the system can
be associated (possibly many-to-one) to a unique eigenstate un of the
measured observable. In Pauli’s specific example, one measures the energy
of the system through collisions (which in general will change the energy of
a system). Knowing the initial energy of the incoming particle, and
measuring its energy after the collision, one can reconstruct for each k the
exchange of energy between the atom and the particle. If each of the
“insolubility theorem” showing that ignorance of the microscopic state of the apparatus
cannot explain the statistical results of a quantum measurement. Note that a slightly
weakened form of this result also follows from the lack of disturbance of the system of
interest through manipulation of the auxiliary system, since the details of the
manipulation of the latter can have no effect on the final state of the former; see
Bacciagaluppi (2013).
46Pauli (1933), pp. 91-92.
47Note that at this level of generality, this is a description of a general
POVM-measurement.
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observed energy differences for the particle corresponds to a unique energy
difference En − Em in the atom, then each measurement result k can be
associated to a unique component un in the initial state (as well as to the
final state um).
Note that in the mid-1930s also Heisenberg repeatedly discussed the
movability of the “cut” between system and apparatus, i.e., the possibility
of treating quantum mechanically the interaction between system and
apparatus. Heisenberg’s most complete (and only mathematical) discussion
of the “cut” argument is in fact contained in his own manuscript reply to
EPR,48 a little-known and posthumously published paper written during
the summer of 1935 at Pauli’s instigation, to which we shall return below.
Ad (b). Also as mentioned, the freedom of choice in manipulating the
auxiliary system has an obvious precedent in Bohr’s own treatment of the
two-slit experiment in the informal discussions with Einstein at the fifth
Solvay conference of 1927.49 Einstein had suggested the possibility of
controlling the momentum exchange between the particle and the two-slit
diaphragm, so as to obtain which-path information. But Bohr realised that
if we did control the momentum exchange, then the position of the
diaphragm would become indeterminate to the extent that the interference
pattern would be wiped out. As he puts it in 1949, “we are presented with
a choice of either tracing the path of a particle or observing interference
effects”,50 with the corresponding experimental arrangements given by a
movable diaphragm or by the diaphragm bolted to the rigid support,
respectively.51
Indeed, in his reply to EPR Bohr refers explicitly to the two-slit
experiment to bolster the idea that if we fix the diaphragm to the support
we cut ourselves off from the possibility of controlling the momentum
exchange, and that if we measure the momentum of the diaphragm we cut
ourselves off from the possibility of knowing its position. In both cases the
argument is that momentum information for the diaphragm is connected
with subsequent path information for the particle, while position
information for the diaphragm is connected to the subsequent presence of
48Heisenberg (1985). His mathematical treatment of the interaction between system
and apparatus in this manuscript is, however, faulty, as discussed in Bacciagaluppi and
Crull (2009).
49Cf. Bohr (1949).
50Bohr (1949), p. 217.
51Bohr (1949), pp. 219-220.
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interference — but path information and interference are incompatible.52
Thus the freedom of choice in the reply to EPR is directly connected to
that in the discussion of the two-slit experiment.53
As one knows from the general theory of measurement, the freedom of
choice in performing different measurements on the auxiliary system allows
one to steer the system into some element of one or another family of
generally non-orthogonal states.54 But it is particularly striking in the case
of a maximally entangled state, where the different families of states into
which the system can be steered are orthogonal, and thus eigenstates of
different self-adjoint operators. Both the EPR state (though improperly)
and Bohr’s example (though approximately) are maximally entangled
states.
In this regard, the obvious precedent (or close cousin) of Bohr’s freedom of
choice is Heisenberg’s γ-ray microscope. The γ-ray microscope was
originally introduced by Heisenberg in his uncertainty paper as a thought
experiment for a position measurement on an electron. A photon of known
γ-wavelength collides with an electron that is smeared out over the object
plane of a microscope. Observing the photon (as normally done in a
microscope) in the image plane of the microscope then allows one to
measure the position of the electron. According to Heisenberg, however,
due to Compton recoil, the momentum of the electron becomes uncertain.
Famously, Bohr criticised Heisenberg’s purely particulate analysis of the
Compton scattering (which would have allowed one to reconstruct also the
exchange of momentum),55 and in his Como lecture gave an alternative
discussion of the uncertainty arising in the Heisenberg microscope.
Like in Bohr’s example, however, one can use the thought experiment not
only for measurements of position (with the corresponding uncertainty in
momentum), but also for measurements of momentum (with the
52Bohr (1935), pp. 697-698 and bottom of p. 698, respectively.
53Despite this connection, I believe Heisenberg overstates his case when he writes to
Pauli on 2 July 1935 that: “The essential point of Bohr’s reply is something like the
following: it can be shown that the Einstein thought experiment is identical in principle
to the repeatedly discussed screen with two slits. The separation between the slits fixes
x1 − x2 of the light quanta, and the momentum measurement on the screen determines
px1 + px2 . One then applies the usual arguments and shows that the simultaneous
existence of interference and conservation laws leads to the Einstein paradoxes”; see
Pauli (1985), p. 408.
54Indeed, EPR remark as such on p. 779 of their paper.
55Cf. Beller (1999), Chs. 4 and 6.
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corresponding uncertainty in position). This may have been part and
parcel of Bohr’s discussion in the Como lecture, where he immediately goes
on to discuss precisely how uncertainty in the position of an electron
results from measurements of momentum (using the Doppler effect) on a
photon.56 It is explicit in the more rigorous (field-theoretical) analysis of
the microscope that Heisenberg set Weizsa¨cker as a task in 1931.57
Weizsa¨cker crucially notes that the microscope can be used to measure
either the position of the electron or its momentum, depending,
respectively, on whether one observes the photon (after the interaction) in
the image plane of the microscope (this is the standard way in which a
microscope is used) or in its focal plane. Thus, the Heisenberg microscope
has exactly the same structure as Bohr’s example of the particle and
diaphragm.
As a matter of fact, Heisenberg used the γ-ray microscope in his own
manuscript reply to EPR.58 The crux of his argument was that (in our
terminology from above) if one places the cut so as to include both system
of interest and auxiliary system on the quantum-mechanical side, then one
can use the auxiliary system to perform incompatible measurements on the
system of interest. But then (repeating an argument Heisenberg had used
in a letter to Einstein of 10 June 1927), if hidden variables existed that
could explain the result of one of these measurements, they would destroy
the interference needed to explain the result of the other measurement.
(That Heisenberg was implicitly referring to the γ-ray microscope here is
made explicit in a letter he wrote on 29 September 1935 to Bohr, who had
found this passage in the manuscript rather unclear.)
Ad (c). The last and crucial aspect of the analogy with EPR is the lack of
mechanical disturbance of the system of interest through the manipulation
of the auxiliary system. While it is a feature of all the examples above
(and other related ones, such as von Neumann’s discussion of a chain of
measurements — in which obviously each successive auxiliary system
56Note, however, that the Doppler measurement of momentum was a separate example
in Heisenberg’s uncertainty paper, coming several pages after the introduction of the
γ-ray microscope, and also in the Como lecture Bohr may have just been juxtaposing
two examples, instead of been describing two alternative ways of manipulating the same
photon in the microscope example.
57Weizsa¨cker (1931).
58See Bacciagaluppi and Crull (2009) for an analysis of Heisenberg’s arguments, and
Crull and Bacciagaluppi (2011) for a translation of the manuscript, with a brief
introduction and full references to the relevant correspondence.
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interacts only with the immediately preceding one), it is not remarked
upon explicitly by any of the above. Only in 1935 have we seen Pauli being
very explicit about it in his letter to Schro¨dinger, and Grete Hermann
discussing it in print.59 In Hermann’s words:
How both conceptions [the wave picture and the particle picture] are
consistent with one another depends on the type of measurement: if
the light is absorbed in the image plane of the observed object, then
one is to work in the wave picture with the conception of a spherical
wave propagating from one point, and correspondingly to ascribe a
sharp position but a smeared exchange of momentum to the
corpuscularily interpreted collision between electron and light
quantum. If one carries out the observation in the focal plane of the
microscope, then one has to deal with a parallel beam of rays, and
accordingly to work in the corpuscle picture with a precisely
determined exchange of momentum but an unsharp position. The
one observational context that the physicist enters through
observation of the photographic plate therefore determines which
features of both pictures are used.60
(In the further case in which no photographic plate is placed in either
plane, Hermann explicitly states that one obtains a linear combination of
product wave functions, and that the process is not anschaulich, the
photon and the electron each lacking individual states.) What is more, one
can check (indirectly) that the respective causal analyses are correct, by
performing subsequent measurements on the electron, the results of which
reflect the corresponding sharp position or sharp momentum at the time of
the collision. As Filk puts it,61 Hermann in her discussion included all the
same elements as EPR, but drew the opposite conclusion about the
completeness of quantum mechanics.
The similarities between Hermann and Bohr are striking, and she in fact
portrays herself in later sections of her essay as presenting Bohr’s own
59Hermann (1935). In his reply to EPR, Heisenberg refers to this essay as expressing
positions close to his. For a rigorous analysis of Hermann’s arguments and views, see,
e.g., Soler (2009). For a wider discussion, see Bacciagaluppi and Crull (2015b) (which
includes also a translation of Hermann (1935) and a reprint of Soler (2009)), in
particular the chapter by Filk (2015) on Weizsa¨cker’s and Hermann’s treatments of the
Heisenberg microscope.
60Hermann (1935), Sect. 12.
61Filk (2015).
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doctrine of complementarity.62
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